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Abstract—This paper takes place in the field of invisible
chaos-based watermarking schemes. It addresses the quality
study of an already pyblished algorithm by focusing on three
class of properties. Its robustness is experimentally shown
against classical attacks on a large set of image instances
and image transformations. It correctness and completness are
formally proven. Due to this main advantages, this process is
fitted for practical use.
Keywords-Invisible Watermarking; Chaos; Robustness; Cor-
rect and Complete message extraction.
Recently, chaos has become an usual technique to define
schemes used for encryption or watermarking [2], [5]. In
this context, embedded watermarks can be either visible
or invisible. In the former case, the mark overlays the
image host and is thus visible. In the later case, the mark
is embedded in such a way that the differences between
the original host and the watermarked one are perceptually
unnoticeable.
Our invisible chaos-based watermarking scheme proposed
in this research work uses such kind of techniques. It is
an extension of a previously released information hiding
method [3] initialy used for steganography, and adapted here
in a watermarking framework in the direction of quality
analysis. Its robustness facing geometrical attacks and signal
processing is studied.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. In
Section I, the watermarking scheme is given. Furthermore,
the correctness and the completeness of the approach has
been proven. This is the first contribution of the paper.
Then, in Section II, the robustness of CI is studied facing
geometrical and signal processing attacks through a large
number of experiments. This is the second contribution.
The documents ends with a conclusion section, where our
contribution is summarized and intended future researches
are presented.
I. THE INFORMATION HIDING SCHEME CI
This section recalls basics of CI formerly defined in [3].
The set of all k−strategies is furthere denoted as to Sk. For
k ∈ N∗, a k−strategy is a sequence which elements belong
into J0, k− 1K. The term “strategy” will be used instead of
k−strategy when the context will easily allow to recover k.
The following notations are also used in the sequel: J0;NK =
{0, 1, . . . , N}, B = {0, 1}, Sn denotes the nth term of a
sequence S, and Vi is for the i
th component of a vector V .
A. Notations used for CI
• x0 ∈ BN is the representation of the chosen Least
Significant Coefficients (LSCs) of a given host media
where the watermark will be embedded. They are
expressed as a vector of N Boolean values. In this work
and in experimentations, x0 is defined as the Least
Significat Bits (LSBs) of the host content, since we
want the scheme to produce an invisible watermark.
• m0 ∈ BP is the watermark message to embed into x0.
This is a vector of P Boolean values.
• Sp ∈ SN is a strategy called place strategy. Intuitively,
this sequence defines which element of x is modified
at each iteration.
• Sc ∈ SP is a strategy called choice strategy. It defines
which element of the watermark is embedded at each
iteration.
• Lastly, Sm ∈ SP is a strategy called mixing strategy.
This sequence gives which element of the watermark
is switched at each iteration.
In what follows, x0 and m0 are sometimes replaced by x
and m for the sake of brevity, when such abridge does not
introduce confusion.
B. The CI scheme
With this material and for all (n, i, j) in N∗ × J0;N −
1K× J0;P− 1K, the CI process is defined by:


xni =
{
xn−1i if S
n
p 6= i
mn−1Snc if S
n
p = i.
mnj =


mn−1j if S
n
m 6= j
mn−1j if S
n
m = j.
where mn−1j is the Boolean negation of m
n−1
j . The stego-
content is the Boolean vector y = xl ∈ BN provided the
following constraints are applied:
1) The number l of iterations is sufficiently large (see
details below).
2) Let ℑ(Sp) be the set {S
1
p, S
2
p , . . . , S
l
p} of cardinality
k, k ≤ l (repetitions are removed in a set). This set
contains all the elements of x that have been modified
along the iteration process. Let us consider ℑ(Sc)|D
defined by {Sd1c , S
d2
c , . . . , S
dk
c } where di is the last
iteration that has modified the element i ∈ ℑ(Sp). We
require that this set is equal to J0;P− 1K.
Let us discuss the constraints given above. The first
one implies that the number of iterations is greater than
a given threshold. This requirement has both practical and
theoretical reasons. Theoretically speaking, the ability to
successfully pass statistical tests is directly linked to this
number of iterations. And, in practice, this value is bounded
by the size of the host content. The second constrain, for its
part, addresses the method’s completeness and correctness,
as detailed below.
C. Correctness and Completeness Studies
Without attack, the scheme has to ensure that the user
can always extract a message and that this latter is the
watermark, provided the user has the correct keys. These
two demands correspond respectively to the study of com-
pleteness and of correctness for the proposed approach.
To achieve this study, let us firstly prove the following
assessment.
Proposition 1: In section I-B, item 2 is a necessary and
sufficient condition to allow message to be extracted from
the host.
Proof: For sufficiency, let di be the last iteration (date)
the element i ∈ ℑ(Sp) of x has been modified:
di = max{j|S
j
p = i}.
Let D = {di|i ∈ ℑ(Sp)}. The set ℑ(Sc)|D is thus the
restriction of the image of Sc to D.
The host that results from this iteration scheme is thus
(xl0, . . . , x
l
N−1) where x
l
i is either x
di
i if i belongs to ℑ(Sp)
or x0i otherwise. Moreover, for each i ∈ ℑ(Sp), the element
xdii is equal tom
di−1
S
di
c
. Thanks to constraint 2, all the indexes
j ∈ J0;P − 1K belong to ℑ(Sc)|D. Let then j ∈ J0;P − 1K
s.t. Sdic = j. Thus we have all the elementsm
.
j of the vector
m. Let us focus now on some mdi−1j . Thus the value of m
0
j
can be immediately deduced by counting in Sc how many
times the component j has been switched before di − 1.
Let us focus now on necessity. If ℑ(Sc)|D ( J0;P −
1K, there exist a j ∈ J0;P − 1K that does not belong to
ℑ(Sc)|ℑ(Sp). Thus mj is not present in x
l and the message
cannot be extracted.
When the constraint 2 is satisfied, we obtain a scheme that
always finds the original message provided the watermarked
media has not been modified. In that context, correctness and
completeness are established.
Thanks to constraint 2, the cardinality k of ℑ(Sp) is larger
than P. Otherwise the cardinality of D would be smaller
than P and similar to the cardinality of ℑ(Sc)|D, which is
contradictory.
One bit of index j of the original message m0 is thus
embedded at least twice in xl. By counting the number of
times this bit has been switched in Sm, the value of mj can
be deduced in many places. Without attack, all these values
are equal and the message is immediately obtained. After an
attack, the value of mj is obtained as mean value of all its
occurrences. The scheme is thus complete. Notice that if the
cover is not attacked, the returned message is always equal
to the original due to the definition of the mean function.
D. Deciding whether a Media is Watermarked
Let us consider a media y that is watermarked with a
message m. Let us consider y′ that is an altered version of
y, i.e., where some bits have been modified. Let m′ be the
message that is extracted from y′.
Let us now check how far the extracted message m′ is
from m. To achieve this, let us consider M = {i|mi = 1}
of the Boolean vector message m and similarly the set M ′
for the message m′. Most of similarity measures depend on
the functions a, b, c, and d, all from BP × BP to N, and
respectively equal to a(m,m′) = |M ∩M ′|, b(m,m′) =
|M \M ′|, c(m,m′) = |M ′ \M |, and d(m,m′) = |M ∩
M ′| (|Γ| and Γ respectively denote the cardinality and the
complementary of any set Γ). In what follows a, b, c, and
d respectively stand for a(m,m′), b(m,m′), c(m,m′), and
d(m,m′).
According to [4] the Fermi-Dirac measure MFD is the
one that has higher discrimination power, i.e., which allows a
clear separation between correlated vectors and uncorrelated
ones. The measure is recalled hereafter with respect to the
previously defined scalars a, b, and c.
MFD(ϕ) =
FFD(ϕ)− FFD(
pi
2 )
FFD(0)− FFD(
pi
2 )
,
FFD(ϕ) =
1
1 + exp(
ϕ− ϕ0
γ
)
,
where ϕ = arctan(
b+ c
a
), ϕ0 is pi/4, and γ is 0.1.
The distance between m and m′ is then computed as
1 −MFD(m,m
′) and is thus a real number in [0; 1]. The
Table I gives an example of the relation between modified
watermarked and the computed distance. If such a distance
is behind a threshold, y′ will be declared as watermarked and
not watermarked otherwise. Next section presents a practical
evaluation of this approach.
0.0 0.03 0.24 0.45 0.66 0.77 0.89 0.94 0.99
Table I
RELATION BETWEEN WATERMARKS DEGRADATION AND THE DISTANCE.
II. ROBUSTNESS STUDY OF CI
This section is devoted to the robustness study of our
scheme. This one has to ensure that the watermark with-
stands against different types of active attacks that modify
the watermarked image.
For the whole experiment, a set of 100 images is ran-
domly extracted from the database taken from the BOSS
contest [1]. In this set, each cover is a 512× 512 grayscale
digital image. The considered watermark m is given in
Table I. Testing the robustness of the approach is achieved
by successively applying on watermarked images attacks like
cropping, compression, geometric transformations,. . .
Remark 1: On the following figures, the difference per-
centage corresponds to the distance between the retrieved
and the original watermarks.
Robustness of the approach is evaluated by applying
different percentages of cropping: from 0.25% to 90%.
Results are given in Fig. 1, which presents effects of such
an attack. All the percentage differences are so far less than
97% and thus robustness is established.
Figure 1. Cropping Results
Robustness against compression is addressed by studying
both JPEG and JPEG 2000 image compression. Results are
respectively presented in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b). It is not
hard to see that robustness is well established for JPEG2000
compression: for all the ratio larger than 10%, the watermark
is retrieved. However, our scheme is not robust against JPEG
compression for a ratio inferior to 90%.
A potential solution in order to improve this result should
be to insert the watermark in least significant coefficient of
the image described in frequency domain as for example
with discrete cosine transform or with wavelet transform.
This study will be described in future works.
(a) JPEG Effect
(b) JPEG 2000 Effect
Figure 2. Compression Results
Among geometric transformations, we focus on rotations,
i.e., when two opposite rotations of angle θ are successively
applied around the center of the image. In these geometric
transformations, angles range from 2 to 60 degrees. Results
are presented in Fig. 3. Thanks to an efficient embedding,
our scheme is resistant to all these types of attacks.
Figure 3. Rotation Attack Results
Let us first recall that this scheme has defined x as the
LSBs of the host and is thus based on LSBs modifications.
This part focuses on two types of attacks modifying these
set of LSBs (see Fig 4). The former consists in setting to
zero a subset of this one. Results are expressed in Fig. 4(a)
and show that the scheme is robust, unless 95% of the
LSBs is erased. In this case the image is really damaged.
The latter consists in applying again this scheme on the
watermarked image but with another message. Results of
Fig. 4(b) show that this scheme is robust against that type
of attack, provided the number of iterations is lesser than
1.75 times the number of pixels. With more iterations, the
image is dramatically modified: more than 50% of the LSB
is switched.
(a) LSB Erasing Effect
(b) Applying Algorithm twice
Figure 4. LSB Modifications
Finally a receiver Operating Characteristic approach has
been implemented to find the most adapted threshold w.r.t.
the separation between watermarked images and other ones.
The Figure 5 is the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve. This curve is close to the ideal one that
is without False Positive and False Negative answer. The
threshold with best results is a distance equal to 0,97. With
such a value, we can give some confidence intervals for
most of evaluated attacks. The approach is resistant to all
the cropping where percentage is less than 90, to JPEG200
compression where quality ratio is greater than 5%, to all
the rotation attacks, to LSB erasing when less than 95% are
set to 0, a second application of the scheme with less than
1.75 iterations per pixel.
Figure 5. ROC Curves for DWT or DCT Embeddings
III. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this research work, a complete quality study of our
scheme [3] has been given, namely robustness, completness,
and correctness. This scheme is now ready for practical use.
To improve again the robustness, notice that the definition
of x can be changed as follows: at worst, any process which
always returns the same set of bits for a given image would
return an amanable vector. However, the most fine would
be the set of bits whose modifications minimize a distortion
function. Following such idea we plan to combine this bit
selection step with feature extraction function. We are aware
that in the field of information hiding it is known that
embedding in LSBs is not a good choice. They are used
in this work in order to validate the concept which remains
valid with an other choice. So in future work these better
choice will be explored.
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